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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr. *
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A FOREIGN JUDGMENT
As part of a marital property settlement, the wife signed a mandate
authorizing a Nevada attorney (or his nominee) to enter her appearance and
represent her in the Nevada divorce action instituted by her husband.
Although she was represented by an attorney in Louisiana, the agreement
was signed at a hastily called meeting at which he was not present.' When he
learned of the incident, he protested the action in a phone call to the
husband's attorney but took no action to revoke the mandate. The divorce
was granted in Nevada several weeks later. The wife later filed a divorce
action in Louisiana and when the husband interposed the Nevada judgment
of divorce as a bar to her action, she attacked its validity. The trial court
sustained the exception and the Court of Appeal, in Clay v. Clay, affirmed.2
Under the principles of full faith and credit3 the judgment rendered by
the Nevada court must be given the same effect in Louisiana as in Nevada
provided the court which rendered the judgment had jurisdiction.4 In Clay,
jurisdiction was based on the plaintiff-husband's claim of domicile in
Nevada 5 and Louisiana, as the state in which the judgment is sought to be
enforced, can inquire into the jurisdiction of the court where the judgment
was rendered.6 But if a defendant enters an appearance and participates in
the original action, he loses his right to challenge the jurisdiction of that
court regardless of whether he raises that issue of jurisdiction.7 Since the
wife in this case had entered an appearance through her attorney, her later
attack on the judgment would seem to be barred. However, it is generally
• Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. There was conflicting testimony on whether she expected her attorney to be
notified by the other parties or had expressly rejected having him present. Clay v.
Clay, 322 So.2d 238, 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 325 So.2d 576 (La.
1976) (result correct).
2. Id. at 238.
3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
4. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1878).
5. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
6. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
7. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
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recognized8 that if a defendant has been deprived, through fraud, of an
opportunity to challenge the validity of the original action or to defend
himself on the merits then this becomes grounds for attacking the judgment
when enforcement is sought in another forum provided it could be attacked
on these grounds in the forum state.9 Since Nevada would allow a judgment
to be attacked on the grounds that the judgment was obtained by fraudulent
practices extrinsic to the cause of action, " Louisiana courts would entertain
a similar attack. The plaintiff's attack on the judgment was that the mandate
authorizing an attorney to represent her had been obtained by fraud and bad
faith on the part of the defendant. The court found that there had been some
coercion with respect to the mandate but concluded that the wife had ratified
the mandate by failing to take any action to revoke it even though she was
represented by counsel who knew of her actions and who had time to file
objections in the Nevada proceedings. The result the court reached was
correct and in accord with settled principles. The interesting point is that
there was no contention by the wife that she had a valid objection to the
proceedings-either with respect to jurisdiction or to the merits-which she
had been unable to assert because of the fraudulently procured appearance
on her behalf. Yet it is this loss of an opportunity to raise defenses in the
original action that is the basis for allowing a subsequent attack on the
judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud.' 1
GUEST PASSENGER STATUTE
If a Louisiana citizen is killed in another state solely as a result of the
negligence of another Louisiana citizen what law will govern recovery if
suit is filed in Louisiana? In Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance
Co. 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the lex loci delicti doctrine and
held that the law of the state where the wrong occurred applied. Three years
later the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co., 13
8. See U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878), and the state cases
collected in 55 A.L.R.2d 673 (1957).
9. Boudreaux v. Welch, 249 La. 983, 192 So.2d 356 (1966).
10. Murphy v. Murphy, 193 P.2d 850 (Nev. 1948).
11. Fraud pertaining to the cause of action (intrinsic fraud) is not grounds for
attacking a judgment because the aggrieved party had a full and fair opportunity to
uncover this fraud at the trial. But if fraud extrinsic to the cause of action prevents a
party from having a fair trial then this is grounds for attacking the judgment. SeeWest
v. Lawrence, 297 So.2d 443 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Liebendorfer v. Gayle, 217
So.2d 37 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Lee v. Carroll, 146 So.2d 242 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962).
12. 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970).
13. 276 So.2d 309 (La. 1973).
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specifically overruled Johnson, describing it as a false conflicts case be-
cause only Louisiana had any interest in the application of its law. Though
Jagers dealt with a question of intra-family immunity and not a guest
passenger statute as in Johnson, its overruling of Johnson should be inter-
preted as meaning that Louisiana law would govern in the hypothetical sit-
uation posed above. But the court in Schoelen v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 14
thought the matter uncertain enough to hold that an insurer's refusal to pay
under its uninsured motorist coverage was not unreasonable and that
therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to penalties and attorney's fees. "
In Schoelen the plaintiff's daughter was killed in a one-car accident in
Nevada as a result of the negligence of the Louisiana driver who fell asleep
at the wheel. Nevada had a guest statute which made the driver liable to his
passenger only for injuries caused by intoxication, willful misconduct or
gross negligence. 1 6 Since the driver was uninsured, the plaintiffs sought
recovery from their own insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage. The
insurer was concerned that, if it paid the plaintiffs and brought suit against
the uninsured motorist, the court might hold Jagers inapplicable because
now the suit was between an insurer domiciled outside of Louisiana and a
Louisiana defendant whereas in Jagers and Johnson all parties were
Louisiana domiciliaries. As a result the plaintiffs were forced to sue the
insurer who filed a third party demand against the driver and after he
confessed judgment in favor of the insurer it confessed judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs. The trial court awarded penalties and attorney's fees and the
court of appeal reversed.
Clearly, if plaintiffs had sued the motorist in a Louisiana court he
would not have been able to use the Nevada statute as a defense under
Jagers. If the insurer had paid under the policy and had been subrogated to
the rights of the plaintiffs it would have been in the same position as the
insureds against the driver. 7 The action would still be between two
Louisiana parties with the insurer entitled to recover only if the insured
could have.1 8 In support of its position the insurer cited Brinkley & West,
14. 318 So.2d 90 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 So.2d 780 (La. 1975) (no
error of law; three justices dissenting).
15. LA. R.S. 22:658 (1950).
16. NEV. R.S. 41.180 (1972).
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2160; LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (4) (1950), as amended by La.
Acts 1975, No. 656, § 1. See Broadview Seafoods Inc. v. Pierre, 248 La. 533, 180
So.2d 694 (1965); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 52 So.2d
311 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
18. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Hecker, 271 So.2d 895 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973).
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Inc. v. Foremost Insurance Co. 9 But in that case the federal court was
concerned with the defendant's interference with various agency contracts
in several states including Louisiana. All of the states except Louisiana
recognized interference with a contract as an actionable wrong. Unlike
Jagers this case presented a genuine conflict of law situation and the court
interpreted Jagers to mean that Louisiana would follow the interest
analysis set forth in the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws section 6.
Nothing in the opinion indicates that the court was at all in doubt as to what
the Louisiana court would do in a false conflicts case like Johnson, Jagers
and Schoelen or in doubt as to whether Louisiana had abandoned lex loci
delicti. The concern created by Schoelen is that it might be read as
indicating doubt as to the position of the Louisiana Supreme Court in a
Jagers-Schoelen type of case when, in fact, the cases give no reasonable
basis for such doubt.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE LAW OF ANOTHER STATE
In Cambre v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. ,20 the plaintiff
brought an action in a Louisiana court to recover for medical malpractice
which occurred during surgery in Jackson, Mississippi. The defendants
were a Mississippi partnership, one of the members of that partnership who
had withdrawn from the partnership and was now practicing medicine in
Louisiana and their liability insurer. After the action had been dismissed
against the partnership and the insurer,21 the remaining defendant filed an
exception of nonjoinder of an indispensable party, namely the partnership. 22
The argument advanced by the defendant was that even though the
partnership had been dissolved upon his withdrawal, it nevertheless had a
fictitious existence with respect to its prior obligations and that a partner
cannot be sued on a partnership obligation unless the partnership is a party.
In deciding this question the court ruled that Mississippi law was applicable
but since neither litigant had cited or relied on Mississippi law in brief or
argument, the court applied the presumption that Mississippi law was the
same as that of the forum. Under Louisiana law the creditor of a dissolved
19. 499 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1974).
20. 331 So.2d 585 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 334 So.2d 435 (La. 1976) (no
error of law).
21. The action was dismissed against the insurer on the grounds of no right of
direct action-LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950); Webb. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 251 La. 558, 205
So.2d 398 (1968). The action against the partnership was dismissed on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction in personam--LA. R.S. 13:3201 (1964).
22. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 737 provides that the partners of an existing partner-
ship may not be sued on a partnership obligation unless the partnership is joined as a
defendant.
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partnership can sue the partners individually 23 and since former partners of
an ordinary partnership are joint obligors, 24 they are necessary parties and
suit will not be dismissed if they can not be joined. 2' Accordingly the court
of appeal ruled it was error to sustain the defendant's exception of
nonjoinder of an indispensable party.
La. Code of Civil Procedure article 1391, which is based on the
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, provides that a Louisiana
court shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state
of the United States. 26 Historically, questions concerning the law of other
states were treated as questions of fact which had to be pleaded and proved
as any other question of fact and could not be judicially noticed. 27 The
Uniform Act made two major changes. It provided for judicial notice of the
laws of another state and also made such questions an issue of law to be
decided by the judge and not one of fact for the jury. When questions
concerning the law of another state were treated as questions of fact to be
proved by the parties, it made sense to say that in the absence of such proof
the law was assumed to be the same as that of the forum especially since both
states derived their law from the same source-the common law of England.
Under the Uniform Act some courts hold that they can take judicial notice of
the law of another state on their own initiative 28 but most require that the
applicable law be pleaded, interpreting the Act as only removing the burden
of proof. 29
The decision of the court in Cambre was thus in line with prior
Louisiana cases 30 and with many cases 3' decided in other states under the
Uniform Act. But this approach may be applying the statute too restrictive-
ly. The intent was to treat questions of the law of another state the same as
questions concerning the law of the forum. Both are questions to be decided
by the judge who is to take judicial notice of the appropriate law. 32 It is
23. Vernon Co. v. Adams, 165 So.2d 541 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
24. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2873; Johnson v. Iowa Rice Dryer, Inc., 226 So.2d 194
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
25. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 643.
26. Id. art. 1391.
27. Welch v. Jacobsmeyer, 216 La. 333, 43 So.2d 678 (1949); 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2558, 2573 at 525, 554 (3d ed. 1940).
28. See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1437, 1446 (1952).
29. See note 28, supra.
30. Welch v. Jacobsmeyer, 216 La. 333, 43 So.2d 678 (1949); Hattiesburg Mfg.
Co. v. Pepe, 140 So.2d 449 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Succession of Shadrick, 129
So.2d 606 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
31. See note 28, supra.
32. Pecora v. James, 150 So.2d 90 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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submitted that it would have been better for the court in Cambre, once it
determined that Mississippi law applied, to inform itself concerning Missis-
sippi law and as article 1391 provides, "The court may inform itself of such
laws in any manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon
counsel to aid it in obtaining such information."-3 3 Such an approach 34
would have been more in keeping with the intent of the Uniform Act and
also the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
33. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1391.
34. More recent Louisiana cases have shown some willingness to do this. First
Nat'l Bank v. Reglin, 266 So.2d 252 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Morace v. Morace, 220
So.2d 775 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
